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1. Introduction 
The gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia in 
January 2009 has shifted concerns about Europe’s 
gas security of supply back into the centre of the 
public debate. Some 18 EU member states were at 
least partly affected by the disruption of Russian gas 
deliveries via Ukraine, which account for around 
80% of Russian gas exports to the EU. Especially 
some of the new member states were severely 
affected, given their low degree of diversification in 
gas imports. The EU, so it seemed, had not learnt 
much from a similar crisis in early 2006 and was not 
much better prepared to deal with such short-term 
disruptions of deliveries of such a critical energy 
source. Indeed, investments in additional storage 
have been insufficient in many member states and 
some of the most crucial interconnectors for a pan-
European pipeline network are still missing. 
However, to say that the EU has been inactive since 
January 2006 would not reflect reality. There are 
numerous initiatives aimed at decreasing supply 
risks. The energy and climate change package 
adopted by the EU in December 2008 will help in 
diversifying energy supplies and in reducing import 
dependence – also in terms of natural gas. At the 
same time, the EU is engaged in strategic 
discussions about future energy security, based on 
the Second Strategic Energy Review tabled by the 
European Commission in November 2008. Finally, 
the EU is struggling to complete its internal gas and 
electricity markets in the conviction that a large 
internal market, served by a wide inter-connected 
network, and receiving supplies from many different 
exporters, will be more secure and stable than the 
current market structure of largely disintegrated 
national and regional markets. However, with 
liberalised European energy markets, supply 
security ceases to be a purely public domain and 
will – at least to some extent – need to be achieved 
by market-compatible approaches. This Policy Brief 
looks at a concrete proposal on how to use markets 
to secure against risks in European gas supplies. Its 
aim is to come up with a crisis response mechanism 
to gas disruptions, which is still missing in the 
current Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures 
to safeguard security of natural gas supply.  
2.  EU energy supply risks  
Increasing the security of supply is essentially a 
strategy to reduce or hedge against risks associated 
with energy production, transport and use. Aimed at 
guaranteeing the functioning of an economy, the 
concept of ‘security of supply’ commonly includes 
concerns regarding the (uninterrupted) availability 
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of adequate supplies at an affordable price level, 
while taking environmental sustainability criteria 
into account. A more narrow definition of energy 
security focuses solely on the availability of energy 
to those who are willing to pay the market price. If 
markets are allowed to function properly, high 
prices may be considered an indispensable tool for 
energy to remain available in tight markets. 
Similarly, they have been shown to accelerate 
decreases of energy intensity in industrial countries. 
The economic impacts of rising energy prices, 
however, may be negative on three fronts: 
increasing energy bills leading to reduced revenues, 
the rise of inflation and interest rates and an increase 
in the import bill. In terms of natural gas, rising 
prices have also had a negative effect on 
investments in new gas-fired plants, adding to long-
run security of supply risks. 
The EU faces political, economic, technical and 
environmental energy supply risks. Political risks 
concern potential government decisions to curb or 
suspend deliveries because of deliberate policies, 
war or civil strife, or as a result of failed regulation. 
Examples include political instability and regional 
conflicts in major supplier countries and politically 
motivated output reductions or import embargos by 
export or transit countries (e.g. a gas cut-off). 
Economic risks mainly cover imbalances between 
demand and supply, stemming from delays in 
investments in strategic projects or insufficient 
contracting. Technical risks include systems failure 
owing to weather, lack of capital investment or 
generally poor conditions of the pipeline system, 
and  environmental risks describe the potential 
damage from accidents such as pipeline bursts. They 
also include other forms of pollution, the effects of 
which are less tangible or predictable (e.g. 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
A distinction is also made between short-term and 
long-term risks. Short-term risks are generally 
associated with supply shortages because of 
accidents, strikes, sabotage, extreme weather 
conditions or technical failures. Long-term security 
concerns the adequacy of supply, the infrastructure 
for delivering this supply to markets and a 
framework to provide strategic security against 
major risks (such as non-delivery for political, 
economic, force majeure or other reasons).  
There are many different risks to Europe’s security 
of supply, of which import dependence on 
politically unstable or unpredictable countries is but 
one. The European Commission recently noted that 
the risk of supply failure associated with increasing 
dependency on imported hydrocarbons is growing. 
However, independence from imports is no option 
and would be no guarantee for security as most 
energy supply disruptions experienced in the EU in 
recent decades have had domestic causes. The 2009 
Russia-Ukraine gas standoff, on the other hand, 
showed that Europe’s increasing import dependence 
on producer and transit countries is an issue to be 
taken seriously.  
3.  The case of natural gas  
Independent of the expected increase in the market 
for liquefied natural gas (LNG), the European Union 
will become increasingly dependent on gas pipe 
supplies coming from very few countries. Although 
over 80% of the world’s natural gas reserves of 
181.5 trillion m3 are located at a distance from 
Europe that allows for pipeline transport, Europe 
lacks the infrastructure to tap resources in the 
Middle East, the region with the largest proved 
reserves (over 40% of global reserves). Almost 90% 
of Europe’s natural gas imports come from just 
three countries, whose governments tightly control 
the gas market. Fears of potential ‘gas cartels’ or of 
energy being used as a political weapon thus do not 
seem completely unfounded. Similarly, there is a 
risk of a lack of investment in exploration, 
production and transportation, despite reserves 
being abundantly available in areas surrounding 
Europe. If gas is unable to take a larger share in 
power generation, it will not be able to live up to 
expectations that it can act as a ‘bridge’ to a low-
carbon economy and may even become a sunset 
industry. In addition, the future carbon price will 
have an impact on the future of the gas markets.   
A competitive, integrated EU gas market is 
advocated by the European Commission as being 
intrinsically more secure than the individual 
member states’ markets. Such reasoning is based 
primarily on scale: a larger, well-interconnected 
market receiving supplies from a variety of 
exporters is expected to be the best insurance 
against the risks indicated above. However, 
numerous conditions need to be fulfilled for this 
conjecture to hold true. Among the most important 
are functioning markets, established 
interconnections, diversification and redundancy of 
import capacity (especially towards Africa and the 
Middle East – also in terms of LNG), and more 
generally the necessary regulatory or contractual 
arrangements. A critical factor is transportation 
capacity to Europe, as it seems likely that projected 
infrastructure will not be able to meet expected 
demand. This requires access to gas reserves, 
opening production to international investments and 
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4.  How much security of supply?
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While free markets will ensure efficient allocation 
of gas in situations of emergency through higher 
prices, there is a case for securing a minimum level 
of guaranteed supplies, especially when energy 
needs to be supplied at ‘reasonable’ prices. Not all 
gas consumers have the same need for secure and 
uninterrupted supply. Gas in households and small 
commercial establishments is primarily used for 
heating and cooking. In situations of emergency, 
such uses can be curbed to some degree. It is 
therefore rational to set the guaranteed level of 
supplies at an appropriate percentage of ‘standard’ 
consumption. In liberal markets, customers have a 
choice of whether to assume responsibility for 
security of supply themselves or to allow the supply 
company to bear the responsibility and subsequently 
to pay a risk premium through higher energy prices. 
The former is typically done by large industrial 
users, for which (short-term) security might not be 
an issue, given they can switch fuels.  
A distinction should thus be made between priority 
(i.e. non-interruptible) and interruptible customers. 
Suppliers should be required to protect their priority 
customers. As long as their exposure to the possible 
negative event (percentage shortfall in supplies) is 
lower than the share of priority over total customers, 
they need not worry about security of supplies. This 
idea suggests that the security of supply standard 
could be defined as the guarantee that all the gas 
volumes demanded by non-interruptible (firm or 
protected) customers are available at a ‘reasonable’ 
price. Such a standard is best established at the EU 
level. Interruptible customers need to be offered 
lower prices since they do not require protection in 
the event of a crisis (they may opt to withdraw from 
the market or maintain their own alternative fuel 
capacity). 
In an interconnected, competitive market, well-
diversified companies enjoying a small protected-
customer base could be permitted to sell emergency 
supply rights to other companies that possess less 
diversified supplies or customer bases (or both), or 
that are more oriented towards priority customers. 
An agency should be in charge of general oversight 
of the security of the system, including the 
surveillance of interconnection capacity and 
ensuring a supplier of last resort. The agency could 
be organised either as an EU or member state body, 
such as an EU agency or a system of national 
agencies, possibly placed within the national 
regulators. The agency could be funded partly by 
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taxpayers and partly by a levy on emergency supply 
rights for importers to meet their minimum-security 
obligations. A company’s gas procurement portfolio 
and the composition of its customer base should 
determine storage obligations. 
Costs could be socialised to some extent because 
diversification of sources, redundancy of import 
infrastructure or a provider of last resort will benefit 
all market participants. Who will be called upon to 
finance this activity is an open question that will 
need to be resolved politically. The cost 
implications for the power sector should be included 
in estimations. 
5.  Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
A second element of security of gas supplies is 
LNG. Supply flexibility, which is a function of 
diversification, the mode of transmission – pipeline 
versus LNG – and redundancy in import 
infrastructure, is very important for both security of 
supply and competition. However, it is also very 
expensive. The development of LNG markets is 
expected to ease some concerns about security of 
supply, especially in terms of pipeline diplomacy, 
because of its advantages of flexibility and 
diversification. Currently, about 10% of Europe’s 
gas imports are in the form of LNG. However, some 
drawbacks remain. Besides the fact that LNG 
technology is vulnerable to physical threats, 
exporters have not kept up with increasing facilities 
in importing countries, leading to some 
regasification terminals standing idle. In addition, 
the EU is expected to face fierce competition from 
other importing countries, such as the US. 
Sustained uncertainty about future gas prices may 
have an adverse impact on raising appropriate 
financing. The good news is that technological 
progress is expected to reduce both capital 
investment and unit transport costs, thereby opening 
up new supply opportunities for pipelines and LNG. 
This calls for a well-calibrated policy regarding the 
regulations applied to the construction and access to 
infrastructure facilities (LNG tankers, terminals and 
pipelines), to avoid hampering their development. A 
systematic and formalised market-surveillance 
mechanism will be crucial in this respect. 
6.  Beyond the market 
The above focus on market-oriented policy options 
does not imply that markets will be able to secure 
future energy supplies all by themselves. Especially 
for long-term policy objectives government action 
will be required. Examples include R&D or the 
development of new breakthrough technologies to 
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promotion of a strong and ambitious energy-saving 
and energy-efficiency policy in the EU and ideally 
across the OECD or even globally could reduce 
dependence on politically unstable or unreliable 
countries. This includes the upgrade of networks 
and the installation of smart metering systems to 
give customers an awareness of their consumption 
through a real time measure. A particular objective 
should be to reflect on how to make the best use of 
natural gas. On the supply side, focus should be laid 
on supporting near-zero carbon technologies such as 
renewables and carbon capture and storage (CCS).  
For natural gas, the objective should be to improve 
the functioning of the internal gas market, notably 
by increasing liquidity both for piped gas and LNG. 
Liquidity of the market presupposes that it remains 
attractive for producers to deliver sufficient volumes 
to the EU and that the right incentives for 
infrastructure investment are in place. In addition, 
better co-ordination or harmonisation of national 
regulations on gas supply and on gas stocks should 
be considered to cope with possible supply 
disruptions.  
Equally important is the coherence between EU and 
member state actions. Given the limited EU 
competencies on energy policies, member states 
enjoy considerable discretion in this area. However, 
national responses to security of supply are partly 
incompatible with the security of supply interests of 
other member states or the EU as a whole. The EU 
should thus develop a ‘European concept for 
security of supply’, including tools (e.g. energy 
policy indicators) to ensure policy coherence at the 
EU and member state level.
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There is also a need to better integrate energy policy 
and foreign policy. This is best done by 
institutionalising dialogues with producer countries 
by using existing tools available, such as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy or trade and 
development policies. By using all available 
instruments and fora, the EU can effectively support 
companies in gaining access to reserves. 
These measures constitute the existing ‘EU 
consensus’ of no-regret options to address EU 
energy policy objectives. Too often, however, such 
no-regret options fail due to policy inertia, 
expediency or simply a lack of interest. To avoid 
such failure in the future, the European Commission 
could be given special responsibility for tracking 
member states’ and EU progress towards the 
implementation of these measures. 